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# West Europe Report

No. 1918



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## PCI'S PECCHIOLI ON BILL FOR 'REPENTANTS' SURVEY RESULTS

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 15 Jan 82 pp 3, 4

[Interview with Communist Party Official Ugo Pecchioli: "How Terrorism Was Reorganized and Why"]

[Text] The events of recent weeks show that we are faced by an extraordinarily dangerous new phase of terrorism. Some majority groups, the governments of recent years, and the serious vices of Italian public life bear responsibility for the resumption of subversive activity. Terrorism had endogenous roots, but there is no lack of efforts by domestic and foreign forces to use it for ulterior motives. New law on 'repentants' needed. Our position on the 7 April trial.

[Question] The police have reacted to the large-scale resumption of terrorism over recent weeks. What temporary conclusions can be drawn from these events?

[Answer] The effectiveness with which the police functioned on that occasion certainly must be appreciated. Finally, after a long period of substantial inactivity, some blows have been struck. However, it should be pointed out that the very size of recent operations reveal what a high degree of reorganization has been newly achieved by terrorism.

In recent years, there has been a substantial impunity. Terrorism--after the attacks on it until 1980--was able to reorganize its ranks and once again launch a challenge. Numerous criminal projects that emerge from confiscated documents, the quality of arms found in the hideouts, and the very size of the operations undertaken in recent weeks (Dozier's kidnapping, attack on the Rovigo Prison, attacks on the UCIGO's [Central Office for General Investigations and Special Operations] of Rome), demonstrate that we are faced by a new phase of extremely dangerous terrorism. We were facile prophets in contradicting those who a year ago considered that the phenomenon had exhausted itself.

[Question] Public opinion was shocked in recent weeks by the ability shown by the terrorists in recent weeks to return and multiply the signs of their presence with militarily complex actions in various parts of the country. What were the causes of the phenomenon which many, as you said earlier, believed until a few months ago was in profound crisis?

[Answer] I believe first of all that the cause was to be found in some uncertainty by groups of the majority and the lack of a policy of renewal by the governments that have succeeded each other over the past year. The behavior of the government of that time during the kidnapping of D'Urso and that of leaders of the DC [Christian Democratic Party] during the kidnapping of Cirillo showed the terrorists that something could be gained through blackmail. Other serious events recently also had an influence. In the case of P2 above all. The presence in the Gelli lists of not a few leaders of security services in fact delivered a hard blow to the relationship of confidence existing between those services and public opinion and, furthermore, could have caused a crisis within them. More generally, the great scandals in Italian public life, the failure to solve the dramatic social problems, particularly in the more critical areas, the refusal to make clear choices of rehabilitation and renewal have continued to keep the terrain fertile for the phenomenon of violence in general and also of subversive violence. Finally, the continuing impunity should be stressed. This is objectively an incentive which black terrorism can continue to enjoy. The fact is scandalous. Not only that, but no evidence has been found concerning the Bologna massacre after a year and a half. Other more serious episodes of fascist terrorism still remain in the shadows. This kind of terrorism has always been able to take advantage, until today, of cover and support in the sectors of public life and of the services (for example, it is necessary to determine the links between members of the P2 and fascist subversive centers).

[Question] However, as the BR [Red Brigades] say in their documents, there exists a political crisis among their ranks.

[Answer] Brigade documents are not sufficient to understand what is really happening on the terror front. It seems there has been a split in the BR. Events will tell whether this is a sign of crisis or a means of broadening the range of action and area of maneuver, including political maneuver. It seems that the so-called "militarists" try to shift forces onto the terrain of the arms struggle according to the phases in the aggravation of the Italian and international crisis (above all in the Mediterranean area). Instead, it seems the so-called "movement supporters" tend above all to re-create a nexus between terrorism and the newer subversive and corporatist mass movements with the aim--in the short range--of increasing the difficulties of governing the country. In this picture, there is no lack even of strange political hints that seem to emerge from certain recent articles by important individuals such as Negri or Scalzone. What is certain is that the strategic objectives of the two Brigade components remain substantially identical and that both aim toward even more serious crimes.

Rather than make illusory prognostications, it is necessary to become committed to raising all the defenses of democracy. Greater mass vigilance is indispensable as are the clear and coherent commitment of institutions and of all democratic forces. In order to make this possible, it is necessary to overcome delays and sabotage of the overall work of reform of all the public security services. Beginning with the problem of the professional character of these services which must be carried to much higher levels.



Today, there is a profound gap between the urgency of what is needed and the delays in what is done. Nothing has been done to solve the dramatic problem of the prisons. The police reform program, approved last 25 April, is being held up by delays and bureaucratic resistances in the phase of implementation. Thus, there is a continual lack of the necessary coordination among police forces. The data bank, instituted by the reform legislation, remains on paper and even regulations for it have not been set forth. The police general council, elected in July, met for the first time only a few weeks ago. Of considerable importance to such questions are the responsibilities of the ranks of the majority which often are outstanding for their absenteeism from parliamentary activity. Finally, in addition to all the present lack of implementation, nothing seems to be able to guarantee us against new future shortcomings, from weaknesses like those that occurred during the time of the kidnapping of D'Urso and of Cirillo.

[Question] What can be said about the new draft legislation on the "repentants?" Doesn't it seem to you that this initiative may have lost part of its potential charge along the way?

[Answer] I am convinced that legislation in this regard is absolutely necessary. I received direct confirmation of this from the meeting, which, together with Leo Valiani, I had last week with some prisoners charged with terroristic actions. They are prisoners who fully cooperated with traditional authorities, to a large extent with serious personal risk, preventing new misdeeds. The phenomenon of disassociation remains latent and is, therefore, to be stimulated with new regulations that would replace those of the Cossiga law, which are useful but now outdated. It can also be repeated here what was said earlier: There's an urgency, but progress is being made slowly due to the responsibility of the majority forces. We presented our draft legislation last July while the government presented its own only in October. And that was an unacceptable text, of marginal constitutionality. It is sufficient to recall that use of bail was considered before the sentencing of the first instance, and that this was entirely entrusted to the discretion of the prosecutor. The new text, which should be sent to the floor soon, seems to have been improved. There are two questions that probably still require discussion. I refer in the first place to the measures designed to rehabilitate all those youths who participated in minimal actions when terrorism exercised a relatively strong appeal and who today live in the nightmare of judicial involvement, or under the blackmail of subversive organizations. Regarding them, the new text does not seem to provide adequate measures for their return to society.

Furthermore, the text provides for a considerable reduction of punishment for those terrorists who limit themselves to dissociation, but do not collaborate with judicial authorities. This would be a negative regulation from every point of view, and not only because it seems to have been made to order for some sons of very important persons involved in subversion. In fact, it sounds like a disincentive for all those who instead collaborate with all the risk that this involves for themselves and their families. Let us not forget that already 12 terrorists who had collaborated have been assassinated and Peci's brother has been killed. We will fight for rapid implementation of the law which must contain new regulations that, to a greater degree, recognize the contribution of those who have helped the forces of justice after breaking with their past.

[Question] Terrorism comes to the surface again while political prospects again become obscure. It is natural to ask about possible political uses of terrorism.

[Answer] We have always been convinced that terrorism has political aims and often acts to influence the political dynamics of the moment. At the time of Moro's kidnapping, it was proposed to block the PCI's access to the government. Today, while there are maneuvers--even dirty maneuvers--that aim toward earlier elections than scheduled, their aim seems to be that of precipitating a crisis, to worsen relations among political forces in order to create a situation that has no solution.

[Question] Regarding the political use of terrorism, the debate on possible international ties of Italian terrorism remains open.

[Answer] I continue to be convinced that terrorism has domestic roots. We would not be able to understand the phenomenon and, in fact, we would underestimate its seriousness if we were to think of it as the long hand of some foreign point of origin. However, we would be equally ingenuous in thinking that attempts do not exist among interested parties to use terrorism also for aims that are mutually opposed, for the destabilization of the country and these could be either domestic or foreign forces. Let us not forget that Italy is a nation that has a special strategic position and domestic political situation; a nation where the battle between the forces of conservatism and those of renewal is particularly sharp and has an exceptional relevance to international affairs.

But what comes of all this if not the requirement that the state services do their duty to the limit in order to protect the economy and independence of the country? And then, why does the Defense Ministry, of which the SISMI, the military intelligence service, limit itself to supporting those who, without certain proof, denounce foreign interference and does not try, instead, to find out and pass on more information?

[Question] The international question, in addition to being linked to the theme of association with others, seems to come to the fore also on the terrain of the objectives of Italian terrorism.

[Answer] This is one of the elements of broad innovation of their platforms. Today, the international crisis is one of the terrains on which terrorism plans to act. Some suggestions of this emerged last year in Italy with the Oto-Melara attack and in West Germany with the attacks on military installations and personnel by the RAF [German Red Army Faction]. This is designed to inflict a blow on the united movement for peace and there is the illusion that they are gaining some sympathy among anti-imperialist groups by attacking persons such as General Dozier.

[Question] The recent episode at the Alfa Romeo, where the terrorists have sent threatening letters against those workers who reject terrorism, brings back to the fore the role of the working class in this battle.

[Answer] Among the causes that have made it possible to revive terrorism there is also a certain decline over the past year in the commitment of the trade



unions. In this regard, some trade-union groups bear a special responsibility. I don't want to reopen polemics, but I cannot forget that the FIM-CISL [Federation of Italian Metalworkers-Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] at the Alfa Romeo, for example, for a long time opposed the initiative of other trade-union groups for the cautionary suspension of worker delegates who in any way were involved in subversion. It was proper to take this step as was later shown by the arrest of Vittorio Alfieri. And there are also responsibilities on the part of those forces who with ulterior motives opened damaging polemics on terrorism. I refer to some trade-union and political leaders who tried to attribute the presence of terrorist groups in the factories to "conflict" among workers. It was as though the workers' struggles could in themselves generate violence. All this weakened the workers movement in the face of capitalist processes of restructurization. These errors, which are fading into the past, have produced polemics that were harmful to the fight against terrorism. I believe they could also have taken place as a consequence of the illusion that terrorism, following the blows suffered, was in a state of decline.

[Question] Another target of polemics continues to be offered by the 7 April trial. In this regard, the statement was attributed to you that "every suspect is guilty unless he can prove his innocence."

[Answer] This is false. The principle of the presumption of innocence is one of the cornerstones of a civil and democratic order. However, it is something else to arrogate to oneself the right to issue not-guilty verdicts before the trial. Regarding the time period, I wish to recall that, since 1980, even taking into account the complexity of the investigation, we demanded a scheduling of public debate. Today, 3 years later, more than ever this demand can no longer be put off. The demand that justice be meted out rapidly is not advanced by us only for those charged in the 7 April case. All defendants, for any crime, all the more if they are in prison, must be assured a public hearing in the shortest possible time.

[Question] However, there are those who have questioned the method used in carrying out the investigation.

[Answer] The hypothesis upon which that accusation has been based will be verified in debate. However, I find it somewhat singular that, granted the legitimacy of discussing the progress of any investigation (and also of any verdict), some were so confident as to accuse the investigators and absolve the defendants. I think it should not be forgotten that it is a matter of individuals who, beyond any judicial outcome, have nevertheless very serious moral and political responsibilities for the birth and development of subversion. We cannot forget what Autonomia [Autonomy] was, either in its theoretical positions or in its subversive practices; what Padua became in recent years; the fact that terrorism had one of its main reservoirs in Autonomy.

[Question] Can an initial summary be made of the questionnaire on terrorism?

[Answer] That is perhaps the largest population survey that has ever been done. Its meaning was very deeply appreciated in various political, cultural and

scientific circles. Today, we are in the phase of collection of the questionnaires which we distributed on the basis of samples (of factories, neighborhoods, schools, etc.). In many localities chosen as samples, the answers range from 50 to 90 percent. At the end of January, we will analyze the results. There will be many tens of thousands of answers. In February, we will begin, with the aid of experts, to evaluate the results that we will make public and will submit to scholars, research centers and anyone else who wants to develop them further. But, beyond cognitive data, I believe it is of great value that the investigation caused so many to think about terrorism and to develop from that reflection a firmer civic conscience. Our questionnaire promoted this reflection by the masses. In order to defeat terrorism, the institutions must be firmly committed, but the commitment must in the first place be that of the people and the forces representing the people.

6034

CSO: 3104/98

## ECONOMISTS WORRY OVER LARGE AMOUNT OF CREDIT TO EGYPT

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 11 Jan 82 pp 27-28

[Article by Jean-Claude Hazera: "Egypt is Expensive to Us"]

[Text] France sells weapons on credit only as an anomaly. Before being able to announce the sale of 20 Mirage 2000 aircraft to Egypt on Sunday, 3 January, in Cairo, Defense Minister Charles Hernu had to overcome serious reluctance on the part of his counterparts in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This by the way was the principal ceiling on the amount involved in the contracts. The moment France agreed to extend credit to it, Egypt in effect was ready to sign for double or triple the amount.

The economic ministers are afraid that the Egyptian case might be taken only as a precedent by other buyers of French arms. Moreover they would like to limit the financial risk which Egypt is beginning to represent for France. Government authorities do not like to publish these kinds of figures but one can estimate that Egypt already owes France more than Fr10 billion even before the sale of the Mirage aircraft.

Green light. If we are to believe the statements of the customer, Egyptian Gen Abn Ghazala, the bill for the Mirage aircraft and their weapons systems will represent between Fr5 and Fr6 billion in addition, payable within 6 years at 9 percent. In Paris, there is talk of a loan of only 2 billion. At any rate, the loan will not cover the entire transaction and negotiations on a financial agreement are only beginning now. The sale was signed on the basis of a green light given by Elysee Palace, authorizing a loan for 20 aircraft.

Diplomatic considerations weighed as heavily as the economy. The defense minister was thus able to get support from Foreign Relations Minister Claude Cheysson and from Mr Robert Pontillon, Mr Pierre Mauroy's advisor for foreign affairs. Mr Francois Mitterrand wants to make sure that French diplomacy will play an important role in the Middle East and, to do that, he knows that he must have leverage in Cairo, something which is certainly not going to please the French socialists who harshly judge the regime inherited by President Mubarak which has very little democracy. But the diplomats know that they would have more influence on the Egyptian government if they supply it with Mirage aircraft rather than with a subway system for Cairo.

In granting Egypt very advantageous loans, the socialists are only following in the footsteps of the preceding administration. The Fr766 million contracts signed in August 1980 by Thomson for the renovation of the telecommunications network were

based on a loan of Fr600 million, including Fr198 million in treasury loans at 3 percent over a period of 10-1/2 years which is more in the nature of aid rather than a loan. Egypt is typical of these Third World orders where France develops its sales in a more encouraging manner than elsewhere--but at the price of certain financial risks.

With Fr5.5 billion in sales in 1980 and a coverage rate of 1.016 percent (France purchased goods hardly worth Fr545 million), France is Egypt's second-ranking foreign supplier after the United States and might possibly become the leading supplier (sales during the first three quarters of 1981 came to 4.7 billion). Egypt is France's 14th-ranking customer, the first customer for French flour products (agricultural food items account for 40 percent of the sales volume) and a big customer for the equipment suppliers and for BTP [Building and Public Works]. But is this happening at the price of an excessive financial risk?

Egypt is certainly in debt--to the tune of \$13.5 billion as of the latest survey by the World Bank (not including military loans)--but under rather good conditions. The average duration of these loans is about 20 years; this means that the repayment/export ratio, which is about 15 percent, should, considering the current status of the debt, not exceed 20 percent at worst.

For the bankers, the real risk is political. This is why they commit themselves only on a short-term basis. They grant loans today roughly under the same conditions as before Sadat's assassination, perhaps a little better. For the French Government, the risk is different. Accustomed to being supported at arm's length by the United States or Saudi Arabia, the Egyptian regime does not always very clearly differentiate between loans and aid and this is why some people in Paris figure on a resumption of Saudi aid to pay the French bills.

#### The Story of the Mirage 2000

The Dassault team had originally been looking to India for the export of its latest product. But it turned out to be Egypt. The contract taken to Cairo by Defense Minister Charles Hernu involved 20 single-engine Mirage 2000 for close to \$1 billion but the Egyptian commitment also covers other French war materiel. Tomorrow, as part of an experience without precedent, the F-16 aircraft of General Dynamics and the Mirage 2000 aircraft, the big rivals, will cohabit in the Egyptian Air Force.

5058

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## TURKISH-ROMANIAN TRADE AGREEMENT PUBLISHED

Ankara RESMI GAZETTE in Turkish 8 Feb 82 pp 11-20

[Text]

## PROTOCOL

of the Eighth Session of the Turkish - Romanian  
Mixed Economic Commission

The Eighth Session of the Turkish-Romanian Mixed Economic Commission took place in Bucharest from 8 to 12 December, 1981.

The preparatory work for this Session, started on 5 December 1981 in two sub-committees: for trade and finance and for economic, industrial and technical cooperation.

The Turkish delegation was led by Kemal CANTURK, Minister of Commerce and the Romanian delegation was led by Ioan AVRAM, Minister of Machine Building Industry.

The Lists of the two delegations are attached as Annexes 1 and 2.

The Mixed Commission agreed upon the following agenda:

— Follow up of the understanding reached during the high-level visit to Turkey, in June 1978, the provisions of the Protocol of the Seventh Session of the Mixed Commission as well as the adoption of new measures to expedite the realisation of cooperation activities of mutual interest.

— Review of the development of bilateral trade and the adoption of new measures for its further growth and diversification.

— Other matters.

The proceedings of the Mixed Commission were conducted in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and both Parties, expressing their desire and determination to achieve substantial progress in their existing cooperation activities agreed upon measures for the future development of bilateral trade and cooperation.

During the Eighth Session of the Mixed Economic Commission Mr. Kemal Cantürk head of the Turkish delegation was received by the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and had talks with ministers of: Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, Electric Energy; Geology; Machine Tools, Electro technical and Electronic Industry; Finance; Transport and Telecommunication.

In the light of the principles established on the occasion of the high-level discussion and with the purpose of further increasing bilateral trade as well as developing economic cooperation, the two Parties agreed as follows:

I. Trade and Finance

The two Parties examined the development of trade between the two countries and noted with satisfaction its increase in the recent years.

However, both Parties agreed to find new ways and means to further increase and diversify exports of the two countries based on their economic and technological



potentials and development programmes so that a better balance may be obtained in their trade relations. To that end, the Turkish Party informed the Romanian Party of its decision to revert to a fully convertible currency basis in their bilateral trade as of the beginning of 1983.

The Romanian Party took note of that decision.

Beside this, the two Parties decided to extend the existing Technical Arrangement until 31 December 1982. For this purpose, the Central Bank of Turkey and the Romanian Bank of Foreign Trade will exchange letters at the latest by 20 December 1981.

The two Parties established new lists of commodities which will form the object of the trade exchanges under the Technical Arrangement during 1982. List «A» (Romanian commodities to be exported to Turkey) and List «B» (Turkish commodities to be exported to Romania) are attached to this Protocol as Annexes 3 and 4, respectively. The Lists «A» and «B» are not limitative, modifications could be made by mutual consent of the two Parties. The competent authorities of the two countries will take necessary steps to ensure required licences for exports and imports.

In order to ensure a smooth and continuous flow of goods between the two countries, both Parties agreed that their representatives should meet every six months or as and when necessary to review the development of trade and to elaborate and submit adequate measures for solutions to the problems which might arise.

Furthermore, the two Parties agreed to encourage representatives of business circles to conduct their activities more actively and efficiently and to increase their efforts for introducing their products to their respective markets.

In order to acquire wider knowledge on the commercial possibilities of the two countries, both Parties also agreed to further strengthen the relations between their Chambers of Commerce and Industry and decided to encourage exchanges of visits of trade delegations representing various sectors of their economies.

Considering the role which long term commercial contracts play in stable and long-lasting economic relations, the two Parties agreed to recommend to the firms and organisations in their countries to conclude such contracts for products of mutual interest.

The two Parties noted with satisfaction the participation of Turkey to the Bucharest International Fair and the participation of Romania to the Izmir Fair and decided to continue participation, in the following years.

## II. Economic Cooperation

### 1. Cooperation in the field of mining

#### 1.1. Antalya coal reserves.

The Turkish Party informed the Mixed Economic Commission of the existing situation concerning the coking coal reserves in Antalya.

The Commission noted the continuing interest of both Parties to cooperate in this area depending on the progress achieved as regards the situation of the reserves.

#### 1.2. Saray coal deposit.

The Mixed Commission encouraged the effort for cooperation as regards lignite reserves in Turkey and expressed interest in the finalization of certain projects as soon as possible.

The Mixed Commission was informed of the visit of the Romanian delegation of experts to the Saray lignite mine and the discussions held with expert team of the Turkish Coal Enterprise (TKİ) in November 1981.

The Commission welcomed the statement of the Romanian Party that on the basis of the already received documentation and those to be supplemented in the near future, a preliminary technical and economic report for a cooperation framework would be presented by the second quarter of 1982.

#### 1.3. Copper and zinc deposits.

The Commission took note with satisfaction of the interest of the Romanian

side for Rize/Çayeli and Siirt copper projects.

The Turkish Party informed the Commission that an international bidding for these projects was underway and an eventual Romanian offer will be taken into consideration in accordance with the existing procedures in Turkey.

#### 1.4. Other cooperation in the mining field.

The Commission noted that the two Parties were also interested in cooperation in the exploitation of some non-ferrous and non-metallic deposits in Turkey by Geomin-Romania and various Turkish private companies.

The Mixed Commission noted with satisfaction the progress made in the context of Etibank «activated bentonite» and «chemical pure sulfur» projects.

The Turkish Party informed the Commission that the necessary activated bentonite samples were planned to be transmitted to the Romanian Party in April 1982.

### 2. Hydro and Thermo Power Plants

2.1. As regards the Hydro Power Plant «Adıgüzel», the Romanian Party informed the Mixed Commission that a detailed technical and commercial offer was sent to the Turkish Party on December, 3, 1981. The Commission expressed its wish that General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) and Uzinexportimport will, on the basis of this offer, begin negotiations aiming at a final decision by the end of January, 1982.

2.2. The Mixed Commission took note of the bid by Uzinexportimport, for the international tender concerning «Kapulukaya» Hydro Power Plant and noted that all due consideration is being given to the Romanian offer.

2.3. The Mixed Commission noted with satisfaction the interest of the Romanian Party in the «Beyşehir» Thermo Power Plant and other lignite based thermo power plant projects with possible credit facilities, as the case may be, and agreed that the authorities concerned of the two countries should meet in order to achieve further progress in this respect.

To that end, a technical delegation from the Turkish Electric Company (TEK) will pay a visit to Romania in January, 1982.

### 3. Cooperation in town heating

3.1. Combined power plant for a town heating and electricity system for Ankara.

The two Parties noted with satisfaction that the final feasibility study of a town heating system for Ankara was submitted by Romconsult to TEK at the beginning of December 1981.

The Turkish Party will give due consideration to the proposed solutions and will inform the Romanian Party of the outcome.

The Romanian Party informed the Commission that in case this project is decided to be carried out it may cooperate with the Turkish Party, providing:

- design works
- technical assistance
- specific power equipment-manufactured in Romania and not manufactured in Turkey.

#### 3.2 Town heating system for Kayseri.

The Romanian Party informed the Commission that, as a result of the cooperation between Romconsult and the Municipality of Kayseri, the execution design for the central heating system of the town of Kayseri was prepared and submitted by Romconsult and that Romconsult is, at present, carrying out the execution design for the next stage.

Romconsult and the Municipality of Kayseri will continue cooperating in this field according to the contract concluded on 24 January 1980.

### 4. Cooperation in the petroleum field.

#### 4.1. Central Anatolian refinery.

The Mixed Commission evaluated the on-going design activities, material and

equipment deliveries, in the context of the joint project of Central Anatolian Refinery with a capacity of 5 million tons per year, to be constructed according to the contract signed in August 1977. The Commission noted with satisfaction the progress already made and further agreed on the following points

a) Industrialexportimport will finalise the technical and commercial assessment of equipment to be required from third countries and transmit them to the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) within the original period of validity of offers. TPAO will take the necessary measures to conclude the contracts for the above specifications in the shortest possible time.

b) Industrialexportimport will undertake all necessary measures to speed up the deliveries of equipment and material, particular priority being given to assembly equipment.

c) TPAO and Industrialexportimport will continue their efforts to procure as much equipment and material as possible from Turkey and Romania, depending upon the technological progress made in the two countries, even when such material have been initially foreseen to be obtained from third countries.

d) Industrialexportimport will submit soon the revised detailed schedule of deliveries, taking into account the importance and the size of the Project.

The Commission agreed to provide support to the two partners so that they may conform with the contract stipulations, addenda and the decisions recorded in the agreed minutes of meetings with utmost care.

#### 4.2. Cooperation in the field oil exploration and seismic prospecting.

Both Parties took note of the activity already achieved in the field of oil exploration and seismic prospecting and agreed upon the opportunity to enlarge the cooperation in this important field.

#### 5. Cooperation in the field of metallurgy

The Mixed Economic Commission examined further possibilities for cooperation in the fields of metallurgy, sinterization of magnesite production of refractory bricks and fire-clay and have agreed on the following.

5.1. The Mixed Commission took note of the Memorandum of 27 November 1981, between Karabük Demir-Çelik and Uzineexportimport to undertake a joint feasibility study aiming at the entire modernization and expansion of the Karabük Iron and Steel Complex upon the approval of their respective authorities and encouraged Karabük Demir Çelik and Uzineexportimport to continue their efforts to that end with a view to obtain such approval in the shortest possible time, probably before the end of the first half of 1982.

5.2. The Mixed Economic Commission noted with satisfaction the Memorandum of understanding reached between Uzineexportimport and Erdemir on a programme of cooperation for the development and improvement of Erdemir production capacities and its operation practices, signed on June, 29, 1981, and encouraged Erdemir and Uzineexportimport to continue their efforts to realize the cooperation foreseen in the said Memorandum.

5.3. The Mixed Commission noted with satisfaction the interest of Uzineexportimport and several Turkish private sector firms in projects in the fields of manufactory bricks, production of fire-clay and sinterization of magnesite.

The Turkish authorities concerned will give due attention to these projects, according to the prevailing procedures in Turkey.

#### 6. Cooperation in the field of industrial production

The Turkish Party expressed its interest for a joint venture in Turkey for the production of manganese dioxide, graphite and carbon filaments to be utilized in dry cells and the Romanian Party undertook to respond as early as possible.

#### 7. Cooperation in the field of agriculture

The cooperation established in the field of agriculture, within the framework of the relevant Agreement signed between the two countries was appreciated and it was deemed useful to continue and intensify these activities.

8. Cooperation in the field of tourism

The Commission noted that during 1981 exchanges of visits between the tourism ministers of both countries took place and that delegations of the respective ministries of tourism met in Bucharest and in Ankara and it encouraged further cooperation between the two countries in this field.

9. Cooperation concerning road and railway transport

The Mixed Economic Commission noted with appreciation the results of the recent meeting of experts on road and railway transport in Ankara and encouraged further cooperation in these fields.

10. Cooperation on third markets

The Commission was informed that at the invitation of the Turkish Contractors' Association, a group of experts from Romanian specialised companies paid a visit to Turkey in September 1981, for preliminary contracts, exchange of information and discussions concerning the possibilities of cooperation in contracting activities in third countries. This visit will be reciprocated by a delegation of Turkish Contractors' Association during the Spring of 1982.

Both Parties agreed upon the usefulness and importance of such cooperation and decided to encourage this initiative.

11. Scientific and technological cooperation

The Turkish Party expressed its interest for scientific and technological cooperation concerning the utilisation of classical and new types of energy, which was duly noted by the Romanian Party.

12. Cooperation in the field of combined maritime ferry and ro-ro transport

The Mixed Economic Commission took note with satisfaction of the results of the discussions between the concerned authorities in Turkey and Romania, held in Ankara on 25-27 November 1981 aiming at the signature of an Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania on the establishment of direct ro-ro and ferry-boat connections between the Romanian and Turkish Black Sea ports.

The delegates of the organizations entrusted by each party are to meet as soon as possible in order to finalize the terminals of each party, agree upon the main dimensional parameters of the ships and to agree on the technical management, tariff, scheduling and operation matters connected to the ferry-boat and ro-ro line.

III. Other Matters

The Romanian Party renewed its proposal to conclude Agreements on the mutual promotion and guarantee of investments and avoidance of double taxation, respectively, for which drafts were already handed over to the Turkish Party.

The Romanian Party proposed to start the initial negotiations during the first half of 1982.

The Turkish Party took note of the Romanian proposal and will communicate its response, as soon as possible, in order to start the initial negotiations in the first half of 1982.

The ninth session of the Mixed Economic Commission will be held in Ankara by the end of 1982.

The present Protocol shall be submitted to the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the rules and regulations in force in the two countries.

Done at Bucharest, on 12 December 1981, in Turkish, Romanian and English languages, all texts being equally authentic, the English text being the text of reference.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
Kemal CANTURK

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA  
Ion AVRAM

# ANNEX 1

## LIST

of the Turkish delegation  
to the Turkish - Romanian Mixed Economic Commission

Kemal CANTURK	Minister of Commerce, Chairman
Umut ARIK	General Director for Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vice Chairman
Diğer ASENA	General Director for Agreements in the Ministry of Commerce
Cenap EKE	Commercial Counsellor in the Turkish Embassy, Bucharest
Demir ERMAN	Director of Section at the General Directorate of Agreements in the Ministry of Commerce, Special adviser of the Minister
Mehmet KOCABAŞ	Deputy General Director of the General Directorate for Export Promotion in the Ministry for Industry and Technology
Omer BİR	Head of International Technical and Economic Relations Department in the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
Volkan BOZKIR	Director of Section at the Bilateral Economic Relations Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Berati ARISOY	Director of Section of Agreements at the International Economic Cooperation Organisation in the Ministry of Finance
Tuncer KUÇUKKAYALAR	First degree Rapporteur at the General Directorate of Agreements in the Ministry of Commerce
Doğan SEVİM	First Deputy General Director of the General Directorate of Exchange in the Central Bank of Turkey
Müfit NAYIR	Director, Central Anatolian Refinery

# ANNEX 2

## LIST

of the Romanian delegation  
to the Turkish - Romanian Mixed Economic Commission

Ioan AVRAM	Minister of Machine Building Industry, Chairman
Dumitru MUNTEANU	Director in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, Vice Chairman
Alexandru ALBESCU	Commercial Counsellor in the Romanian Embassy
Sorin NEGREA	Director General in the Ministry of Machine Building Industry
Alexandru GHEORGHIU	Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ion TUTELCA	Director in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation
Calin PALAGHITA	Counsellor in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation
Iulian ANCHESCU	Counsellor in the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunication
Dumitru PARVULESCU	Counsellor in the Ministry of Mines
Constantin ENOTU	Director Uzinexportimport Foreign Trade Company
Mihai PORA	Director Industrialexportimport Foreign Trade Company



Carol DOXANESCU  
Constantin ISTRATE  
  
Vasile HREAMATA  
Nedelea RUSE

Director Geomin Foreign Trade Company  
Chief of Department Romanian Bank for  
Foreign Trade  
Counsellor, Romconsult  
Interpreter

ANNEX 3

LIST «A»

Concerning the Romanian Commodities to be Exported to Turkey under the  
Technical Arrangement during 1982

Tariff No's		Thousand US \$
27.10.50	Lubricating oils	5.000
28.17.12	Caustic soda	5.000
Chap. 28-38	Chemical products, including glycerine and glycole	4.500
28.47.35	Sodium Bichromate	2.500
Chap. 31	Fertilizers	35.000
Chap. 39	PVC (powder and granules)	
	polystyrene ,plastics and articles thereof	6.000
48.01.20.29.	Newsprint	15.000
48.01.40	Printing and writing papers	2.000
48.01.50	Kraft paper and other types of papers	500
Chap. 56	Synthetic yarns and fibres	1.000
Chap. 70 and 85	Electronic apparatus and components including TV tubes and parts thereof, ferites, telescopic antennas ,condensers, graphite, diodes etc.	1.000
Chap. 73	Iron and steel products	4.000
73.18	Tubing, casing and tubular goods for drilling	15.000
84.06	Diesel motors	2.000
84.45.63	Machine tools, parts and spare parts thereof	1.500
84.62	Bearings	2.000
85.19.19	High voltage circuit breakers and parts thereof	2.000
85.19.12	Low voltage circuit breakers and parts thereof	1.000
Chap. 85	Electrical conductors for power transport	1.000
85.01	Power transformers and parts thereof	3.000
85.01	Electrical motors (above 60 HP) and parts thereof	2.000
86.09	Wheels, wheel sets for railway wagons and spare parts for locomotives	5.000
87.06	Spare parts for tractors and vehicles	3.000
Chap. 90	Measuring and control instruments and apparatus	500
Miscellaneous.	Pharmaceutical products and raw materials thereof	1.000
Miscellaneous.	Geological and water drilling rigs, parts and spare parts thereof	5.000
Miscellaneous.	Drilling bits	15.000
Miscellaneous.	Drilling tools	3.000
Miscellaneous.	Oil field equipment for drilling and production, parts and spare parts for drilling rigs	10.000
Miscellaneous.	Capital goods (mining, earth moving equipment and other machinery and equipment, parts and spare parts thereof)	6.000

## ANNEX 4

## LIST «B»

Concerning the Turkish Commodities to be Exported to Romania under the Technical Arrangement during 1982

	Thousand US \$
— Fish and other sea foods (fresh, frozen and tinned)	1.000
— Cotton	25.000
— Cereals	PM
— Citrus fruits	25.000
— Ground nuts	2.000
— Hazel nuts	1.500
— Pistachio nuts	500
— Chick peas	5.000
— Lentils	1.000
— Beans	500
— Bay leaves	300
— Olives	15.000
— Olive oil	500
— Raisin (seedless)	3.000
— Raisin (with seeds)	500
— Dried figs	1.000
— Fruit juice	1.000
— Plant seeds <sup>(cumin)</sup> containing seeds etc.)	800
— Medicinal plants	100
— Gum tragacanth	100
— Molasses	12.000
— Malt	1.000
— Tea	500
— Tobacco	2.000
— Cigarettes	2.000
— Tomato paste	1.500
— Onion, garlic and potatoes (fresh, dry and dehydrated)	2.000
— Valonia extract	500
— Saponariae roots	100
— Mohair	1.000
— Viscose cellulose	5.000
— Tanning materials and products	400
— Chemical products and pharmaceuticals.	4.000
— Sinter magnesite	2.000
— Tincal	7.000
— Ferro-Chromium (of low carbon)	1.500
— Ferro-Chromium (of high carbon)	2.700
— Chromium ore	8.000
— Lignite	3.000
— Mercury	500
— Pig iron	PM
— Boric acid	1.000
— Borax	1.100
— Bauxite	600
— Baryte (ground)	2.000
— Perlite (crushed, screened and <sup>graded</sup> specified)	300

Thousand US \$

— Sodium perborate	1.500
— Aluminium (sheets, foils and profiles)	1.500
— Sanitary equipments and parts thereof	1.500
— Glass and glass products (including wind shields)	500
— Electrical household appliances (refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, fans etc.)	1.500
— Textile products	3.000
— Cotton yarn	3.000
— Parts and spare parts for tractors	1.500
— Spare parts for cars	4.000
— Razor blades	750
— Cosmetics	500
— Soaps	500
— Detergents	1.500
— Synthetic rubber	2.000
— Refractory clay	2.500
— Refractory bricks	500
— Marbles and chips thereof	500
— Ceramic and mosaic tiles	750
— Onyx and chips thereof	500
— Wine (red)	2.000
— Furniture	5.000
— Other industrial products	3.000
— Sporting rifles, capsules and cartridges	500

12 December 1961

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to confirm that in our talks during the Eighth Session of the Turkish - Romanian Mixed Economic Commission we reached the understanding concerning the settlement of payments in 1982 through account No. 4 of the Technical Arrangement of the following items, in addition to those which are indicated in List «A».

— Engineering works and technical assistance for the sodium bichromate plant under the contract signed with Keban Holding Company	US \$ 450.000
— Outstanding payment for tractors supplied to Köy-Koop in 198.	approximately 3.500.000 US \$ or the value to be determined by the Court of Jurisdiction

I take advantage of this opportunity, Mr. Chairman for assuring you of my highest consideration.

Kemal Cantürk  
Head of the Turkish Delegation

H. E. Ioan Avram  
Head of the Romanian  
Delegation

12 December 1981

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to confirm the understanding we reached in relation to the aspects indicated in your letter dated 12 December 1981, regarding payment in Account.

I find this an opportunity to offer the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ioan Avram

Head of the Romanian Delegation

HE Kemal Cantürk  
Head of the  
Turkish Delegation

CSO: 4600/272

## BRIEFS

PROGRESSIVE PARTY LOSING SUPPORT--Copenhagen--Mogens Glistrup's Progressive Party is taking a nose dive in Danish opinion polls. In the Folketing election in December the Progressive Party dropped from 20 to 16 seats. In a Gallup poll printed in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE over the weekend the party lost the equivalent of another two seats. A poll conducted by the AIM [expansion unknown] institute and printed in the newspaper BORSEN would reduce Glistrup's party to 10 seats. EKSTRABLADET wrote that the Progressive Party would be wiped out in just a few years. The polls show that in particular Erhard Jakobsen's Democratic Center Party has won Glistrup votes. The Progressive Party first entered Folketing in 1973, becoming the second largest party all at once. Now it has been reduced to third place, according to the polls. [By Palle Hermund] [Text] [Oslo DAGBLADET in Norwegian 8 Feb 82 p 7] 6578

CSO: 3108/63



## SPD'S EHMKE ON EUROPEAN FUNCTION OF OSTPOLITIK

## Excerpts From Ehmke's Paper

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 15 Jan 82 pp 6, 7

[Paper by Horst Ehmke: "The Value and Timeliness of Ostpolitik"]

[Text] The European function of inter-German policy. Increasing attention to relationships and tensions between the two super-powers, but also the role of China, the nonaligned countries, the contrast between North and South.

We publish here a comprehensive extract from the paper given by Horst Ehmke, a leader of the SPD, on the international policies of his party, at a seminar organized by "Mondoperaio" in Rome Jan 7 and 8.

The end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's marked a turning point for us. The program adopted at Bad Godesberg in 1959, while, in terms of international policy, aimed towards the modification of society through reforms, strictly followed the foreign policy adopted at Heidelberg in 1925, taking into account, of course, the new world and national situation and the historical changes brought about with the advent of nuclear arms. It also went beyond positions outlined already, adopting the concept of "defense" scaled to the reality of a new democratic state order, and placing the commitment in this area within the limits that form the basis for international detente, of controlled disarmament and national reunification.

In political practice, the SPD shortly thereafter fundamentally accepted negotiations with the West, which it had fought against in the 1950's. This took place in the famous speech given by Herbert Wehner at the Bundestag on 30 June 1960. At the same time, other occurrences, chiefly the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1960, led to the maturation of the peace policies and detente associated with Willy Brandt, policies which would develop in 1966-67 with the participation of the SPD in a "great coalition" government and after the 1969 electoral victory with the social-liberal coalition.

I will limit myself to listing summarily the steps of Ostpolitik: The treaty with the USSR concerning the renunciation of the use of force in 1970; the successive treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia; the quadripartite agreement on Berlin in

1971; the fundamental treaty with the GDR in 1972; and finally, in 1975, the Helsinki accords. This list already shows that the government led by the SPD, basing itself on treaties with the West, has profoundly changed the attitude of the FRG towards the East. Social democratic policy moves in a European direction but is not Eurocentric. It also aims towards making the "bipolar" relationship between the United States and the USSR more relaxed, is open to the development of other "poles" such as China and the "nonaligned" countries as factors essential to stability, and puts forth the North-South relationship with all of its implications. I would, nonetheless, like to turn again to Europe and treat, in particular, three themes about which I have long asked for more open discussion with our allies.

First of all, the German question, which, together with the growth of the peace movement, has again begun to upset some of our neighbors. Thirty years ago, the then president of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, said that the party also had the task of "giving a new national consciousness to the German people, far removed from both the stormy superiority complex of the past and of the tendency, widely diffused today, of considering any allied request as a manifestation of Europeanization." Today, however, this German consciousness can only be part of a European consciousness. What does this mean for us Germans? Not what Robert Havemann asks in an open letter sent from East Berlin to Brezhnev and signed by many citizens of the two Germanies: That there must be a peace treaty for Germany, that the occupation troops must therefore withdraw, and that the forms of the solution of the national question must afterwards be left to the Germans themselves. The question is not how to reconstruct the German Reich of 1871, but rather how our divided country can contribute to overcoming rather than deepening the division of Europe.

An inter-German policy has three dimensions for us. First--and here we agree with Erich Honecker--a war must never again begin on German soil. As Herbert Wehner said 12 years ago: "The test of maturity for our nation consists of the fact that we are forced to live separately, but at the same time, we should aim for peace together." The second dimension is the progressive wearing down of what up to a short time ago was called the "iron curtain." For us Germans, it is a question of national cohesion, while in the European perspective, it is a question of human rights. Third: The peaceful competition between different and even contrasting social systems. The last dimension is indissolubly tied to the German question, not only because the border that divides Europe passes through the heart of Germany, but also because Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were born in this country.

The second theme I want to discuss is the relationship between the renunciation of force and the continuation of our ideological confrontation with Soviet communism. We must always remember that the division of Germany and Europe corresponds to the ideological division of the European labor movement. Our opposition to Soviet communism has not been changed by detente. But we are also attentive to the ideas of the Eastern reform communist press and to Eurocommunists in the West. We have the impression that the Soviet socioeconomic system is by now so inflexible that it is no longer able to resolve the problems of the people who live under its aegis; and even less able to safeguard the dignity of man, and thus to fulfill the great hope of socialism. The situation in East Europe is even more clear, where the system is perceived not only as insufficient but also as foreign. The facts demonstrate that Soviet communism, in the long run, cannot take hold in East Europe. On the other hand, Soviet political leadership will not and cannot let its role as an East European bastion break down, a role that was taken on after the Hitlerian War and for which the Soviet people paid such a high price in bloodshed. But this is not only a dilemma for East and West Europeans, it is a dilemma for the Soviet Union itself.

What motives and interests have inspired the Soviet policy of detente? In my opinion, the Soviets wanted, above all, to gain access to Western capital and technology for their own development, but also to moderate their position in East Europe in terms of the economic profile and national feelings. The USSR has had to pay a price, accepting some "danger of contagion." If it remains firm in its intent to continue cooperation with the West, it must also pay this price in the future. If it should abandon this intent, the USSR can perhaps prolong the existence of the present system in East Europe by isolating itself and East Europe from the West, but it certainly cannot save the system. Thus the Soviet leadership itself must question whether the response to the problem of East European stabilization should be reform and not tanks.

The praise recently given by Soviet exponents for the tacit but profound reforms in Hungary prove that Moscow is perfectly aware of the dilemma. And we must ask ourselves sincerely if the caution of the USSR concerning the Polish question beginning with August 1980 would not bring about an opening to analogous developments, within the limits defined by the needs of Soviet security policy. The confrontation with the necessity for reforms is, in any case, real.

Thus the West, and in the first place, we West Europeans, must create a policy aimed at widening the maneuvering space for reform movements in East Europe. But this is possible only if we keep in mind Soviet security interests in East Europe, even if some will not accept this premise.

To complete this theme, I would like, finally, to point out the specific example of long-suffering Poland. I don't know of anyone in the United States or in Western Europe, who thinks that NATO should, at the worst, risk a war to sustain reformist tendencies in East Europe. To say the least, I found improper the fact that a previous American administration had led the Soviets to believe, in 1968, that they could resolve the problem brought about by the "Prague Spring" in their own way. But all of us--and above all, in the interests of the Eastern people--would say that anyone who maintains that the results of World War II could be revised by military means is irresponsible.

If this is the situation, it would be a dangerous fraud to create the impression that it is different. We are talking about an extremely dangerous policy with respect to the USSR and about tremendous deception with respect to the peoples of East Europe. For all that we want to change in Europe, the principle of the renunciation of the use of force is paramount--with the penalty of total catastrophe.

This observation does not in any way exclude a positive commitment towards reform movements in East Europe. Our sympathy and solidarity must go, for example, to those who fight in Poland for those rights which the labor movement in Europe sought more than 100 years, and moreover, the Soviet Union has signed in the Helsinki accords. And our judgment on any type of repression cannot be favorable. We must balance all those who maintain that they can overcome the dilemma by a show of strength with the experience of the SPD's foreign policy: What is necessary is not "big words" but "small steps" strategically placed to encourage, or at least make possible, steps in the same direction.

A policy based on the awareness that reform can only be a long historic process presents a weakness. Those who, at great risk, aspire to reforms in East Europe, are not willing to permit us Westerners to decide what percentage of liberty is due them from one time to another. I understand this only too well, and claim no rights in

this respect. I hope, however, to be in agreement as well with the reformist forces of East Europe concerning the fact that they, too must respect the conditions of the nuclear age, if the reunification of Europe is not to come about in a cemetery.

I have spoken at such length of our policy in Europe that you could justifiably accuse me of Eurocentrism if I did not immediately add that this policy cannot be viewed separately from the relationship between the two superpowers and between the two blocs, nor from the North-South relationship. A Europe which believes it can live peacefully between the two superpowers--that it can live, so to speak, in a natural park, in the calm of the winds of world politics--would lose any possible influence over the policies of the superpowers, and would not be able to defend its own interests, even and precisely in security matters. Even a lasting easing of tension between blocs and inside them, which is the objective of the Bad Godesberg program, of Rapacki and others, and is wished for by the European peace movement, can be obtained only through bloc-to-bloc negotiations. That small amount of stability which survives in international politics and which is based on the reciprocal deterrents of the superpowers, on the threat of nuclear destruction, must be integrated by a security partnership over and above the blocs. We cannot hide the fact that great difficulties and problems arise here.

Nor must we hide from ourselves the fact that our greatest task remains in helping the Third World to find its own way and order which separates it from the rivalry between the superpowers.

#### SPD Foreign Policy

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 15 Jan 82 p 6

[Article by Giorgio Napolitano: "We and They"]

[Text] The speech on international politics given by Horst Ehmke at the convention on German Social Democracy organized by the Italian Socialist Party has put forth very interesting ideas, especially in the framework of discussion which the facts in Poland have rekindled in the hearts of the European Left. Thus the affirmation of the "European function of inter-German politics" has appeared significant, in the sense that it is important to work through the development of relations between the FRG and the GDR so that "our divided country can contribute to overcoming the division of Europe instead of deepening it;" or the affirmation of the "non-Eurocentric" character of the policy that the German Social Democratic Party intends to carry out. It begins with a European dimension, but gives increasing attention to relationships and tensions between the two superpowers, to the role of China, to the role of the nonaligned countries, and to the crucial contrast between North and South. But most revealing has been his spirited evaluation of Ostpolitik and more generally of the politics of detente, and his insistence on the necessity of bringing forth and facing the decisive question of the arms race between the great powers without hiding the "differences in viewpoint and even interests" arising with regard to it between the West European countries and the new American administration. The talk on the dramatic events in Poland and on the problems of vaster significance reposed by them was tied to this fundamental viewpoint.

Our appreciation for the framework of Ehmke's speech has not impeded us from remembering the dissention expressed by the Italian Communist Party on the decision--recalled and defended by Ehmke--of the NATO Council in December 1979: Dissent that



we attributed not only to the negation of the need to verify and guarantee military equilibrium between the two blocs, particularly in the European theater, nor to a negation of Soviet responsibility for the crisis in detente and the relationship of trust between East and West, but to the necessity for effective experimentation in a real attempt to stop the production and installation of SS-20 missiles and to reach the negotiation stage before deciding on a program of construction and deployment of new Pershing and Cruise missiles. However, Ehmke's speech has offered an important point of convergence on objectives of negotiations finally underway between the United States and the Soviet Union, and concerning the affirmation that these negotiations "are not questioned by anyone."

It is clear, moreover, that only those who start from intransigent positions, or those who insist on positions of propagandistic agitation and not responsible analysis, can present the line of the Social Democratic Party and of Federal Germany in terms of indifference--explainable as commercial calculation or as the logic of exasperated political realism--for reformist efforts, for the needs of liberty and democratic change which arise in the East European countries. The real problem that has come out is /how to sustain/ [in Italics as published] reformist efforts and forces in those countries, knowing that one must "keep in mind the interests of Soviet security" and that "the conditions of the nuclear age" must be "respected." It is correct, we feel, to emphasize how the politics of detente have favored the diffusion of the need for renewal in the area of "real socialism," have enlarged the "maneuvering space" for reformist movements. It is right to restate as well the conviction that the Eastern countries and the Soviet Union must evaluate themselves with the contradictions and objective necessities for reform. At the same time, direct encouragement--by political pressure and diplomatic initiative--must be proposed, as well as the recognition of fundamental democratic rights: Concretely today, in Poland, the refurbishing of the constitutional guarantees and elementary liberties. Ehmke has also affirmed that "naturally our economic aid to Poland will be independent of future developments of the Polish situation," but noting that food and medical aid must continue in any case, thus establishing a clear distance from a policy of sanctions and breakdown in economic collaboration with Poland or with the Soviet Union itself.

Finally, one of the motives for interest in Ehmke's paper has been, in my opinion, given by the way in which he has posed the question of the "ideological confrontation with Soviet communism," that is, by the fact that, though starting with historical precedents and affirmations of principle--about which there would naturally be alot to say from our point of view--of German Social Democracy, Ehmke has made a net distinction between the positions of the "American Right" and the European Right" and the duties of the "Democratic Left" which must not fear "contact" but must commit itself in a "contest" with Soviet communism, or better, we say, with the ideology, the "model," the real experience of which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is champion. Ehmke has spoken, concerning this, both of the necessity for attentively watching the positions of "Communist-reformist character in the East and of Euro-communist character in the West," and of the need--in terms of the crisis which has invested Western society--"for a new outlook on the part of the European Left, which goes beyond the traditions of the Welfare State." Thus, it appears to me that the door can be opened for dialogue and a common search between Socialist and Social Democratic forces and Communist forces such as the Italian Communist Party which, by its condemnation of the military coup in Poland, its sharp criticism of the Soviet



"model" and of the prevailing currents in the USSR, has found--discussion on the Central Committee confirms this--motives for further commitment towards the development of a new phase in the struggle for socialism, for the definition of a way that permits overcoming, at the same time, the contradictions, the limits and the crisis of the Social Democratic experience.

9941

CSO: 3104/114

## COUNTRYWIDE SIGNIFICANCE OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN ELECTIONS NOTED

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 11 Feb 82 p 3

[Article by Gert Kistenmacher: "First Election of the New Year -- Parties Competing Only Half-Heartedly in Communal Political Arena"]

[Text] Kiel, February -- The first of this year's more important elections in the FRG takes place on 7 March, which means that about 1.9 million eligible voters in the northernmost federal state of Schleswig-Holstein will then have the opportunity to elect their representatives in the approximately 1,100 municipalities and 11 district parliaments. Although a decision on municipal parliaments scarcely reflects an opinion on the Federal Republic, this communal election nevertheless takes on added interest because it will have a considerable influence on the subsequent state legislature election in Schleswig-Holstein in the spring of 1983. These communal elections could also gain countrywide notice as a yardstick for the ensuing elections to state legislatures in Lower Saxony and Hamburg. As far as Minister-President Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) is concerned, of course, his prestige is on the line once more -- namely, as concerns the internal party struggle over the Union's candidacy for the chancellorship. Moreover, every election in past years has confirmed that Schleswig-Holstein numbers among the states with the greatest political mobility.

All the parties appear thus far to be vying only half-heartedly for the voters' favor. Nor has a recently published poll managed to prod anyone into any special activity, since the outcome of the election promises no great surprises. The poll -- whose source is identified as the Kiel State Chancellery -- allots approximately 50 percent of the vote to the CDU, 35 percent to the SPD and 10 percent to the FDP; the Greens' share is about 5 percent. To be sure, the figures that are clearly designed to be a contribution to the election campaign do not mention that they are based on results from last year, when the Bonn social-liberal coalition had reached an absolute low.

Nevertheless, no reason for pessimism is seen by Schleswig-Holstein Social Democrats, who have maintained a critical distance from the Bonn coalition quite often in recent years. Klaus Matthiesen, opposition leader in the Kiel state legislature, admits that "judging by the overall political situation, we certainly won't come out of this communal election as glorious winners." He hopes to establish a good starting position for the state legislature election, and he would be satisfied if his party could repeat its result from the preceding communal elections -- 40.5 percent of

the vote. The CDU, on the other hand, intends to measure itself against the 50-percent margin, thus improving its 1978 figure (49.2 percent). Compared to the 1980 Bundestag election, when it recorded its worst result since 1949 with only 38.9 percent of the secondary vote (SPD: 46.7 percent; FDP: 12.7 percent), it would have to win more than an extra 10 percent. The FDP hopes that the favorable national trend will carry over to the communal level, and that its poor 1978 result -- 7.3 percent -- will be boosted by at least 2 points.

The election platforms put together by all the parties got no response from the public even at the time they were passed; they are no longer playing any role at all in the campaign. "Close touch with the public" is therefore the watchword for the SPD, CDU and FDP, which are earnestly seeking a dialogue with the voter. When asked about the organizational course of the campaign, the party headquarters display rare agreement in giving notice of their intention to conduct a "low-budget election campaign" this time -- probably partly in response to the political contributions scandal. The SPD plans to get by on approximately DM 240,000 at the state level. Of course, outlays by the local and district associations are not included in this amount. The CDU will not let anyone see its financial cards, but it concedes that it plans to lay out about 30 percent less than it did 4 years ago; the FDP intends to allocate DM 60,000, or only half the amount budgeted in 1978. Moreover, there is a growing trend in the entire state toward putting a stop to the political poster madness of past campaigns by means of campaign pacts and agreements.

Since money is lacking, all parties have tried to come up with new and original ideas. The SPD, for example, is planning to use art and artists to win votes. "Songs Against War" is one motto, and some of those persuaded to take part are the Blattschuss brothers, Bettina Wegener, Knud Kiesewetter, Hans Scheibner, Erika Pluhar and Dietmar Schoenherr. Also planned is a traveling art exhibition entitled "Artists for Peace." In addition, the SPD intends to bring its policies closer to the public by means of a small newspaper, in which peace policy and unemployment will be among the most important topics. The CDU's main weapons are its portrait of government chief Stoltenberg and the slogan "These times require men and women with political common sense and fresh ideas." Planned as a "second line of action" are so-called argumentation posters containing concise statements from the campaign platform concerning family policy, environmental protection, youth and other topics. Although all the parties assert that the election campaign will be focusing on local problems, not federal policy, many prominent federal figures are being summoned. Some who have been announced are Helmut Kohl, Alfred Dregger, Willy Brandt and also Wolfgang Mischnick, who plans to tour the small-town taverns, playing skat as he goes.

The election researchers at party headquarters have spent recent days reviewing the 1978 election results in order to ferret out weak spots or pinpoint strongholds. The SPD, for example, is in an especially strong position in the state capital, Kiel, where it managed an absolute majority with 50.3 percent of the vote; it has to maintain this position for reasons of prestige. An exciting race is expected in the border city of Flensburg, where the CDU and SPD each received 17 seats in the city parliament, while the FDP was shut out. The CDU wants above all to regain lost ground in the heavily populated areas on the outskirts of Hamburg, where a good 25 percent of the eligible voters live. Four years ago, for instance, the SPD

had increased its share by 11.2 percent in Kaltenkirchen and by 10.1 percent in Pinneberg. On the other hand, the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein is still regarded as a particularly "black domain." For example, the CDU took the Dithmarschen district with 54.3 percent in 1978. The Greens can count on special attention; four years ago they surprised everyone by managing to send three representatives to the Steinburg district legislature and two to Husum's district parliament. The onetime friends have meanwhile been at odds with one another for the most part, but the environmentalists maintain a strong position precisely in the west coast area of Schleswig-Holstein. It is because this is where two assaults on the environment, both of which are rife with protest, are scheduled to be made -- the disputed construction of the Brokdorf nuclear power plant and the planned dike construction at Nordstrand Bight.

The parties on the extreme right and the extreme left have thus far had a negligible impact. The [Federal Office for the] Protection of the Constitution has observed that the DKP, which managed 0.5 percent 4 years ago, is again concentrating on the town of Barmstedt where it won 12 percent of the vote, thus enabling it to occupy two seats at the town hall. The protectors of the constitution -- acting in this case as election researchers -- claim to have ascertained that the DKP functionaries are taking an even more assiduous interest than before in matters of local concern and are hoping to be able to send their third man to Barmstedt Town Hall on 7 March.

7458

CSO: 3103/275

## CONSERVATIVES LOSING SUPPORT OVER TAX-PROMISE ISSUE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 8 Feb 82 p 6

[Article by Tone B. Jamholt]

[Text] Take it easy and wait and see. Don't rejoice too soon. That seems to be the message from the Labor Party leadership to the voters after the Labor Party passed the 40-percent milepost in the poll conducted by the Marketing and Media Institute. The poll was published in DAGBLADET Saturday and showed that once again 10 percentage points separate the Labor Party and the Conservatives.

The figures from the opinion poll, which was conducted in the period 19-26 January, were: Labor Party, 40.9 percent, a gain of 3.1 percent. Conservatives, 30 percent, a decline of 1.4 percent. The Center Party had 6.2 percent support, the same as in December. Christian People's Party, 9.4 compared to 9.0 last time. SV [Socialist Left Party], 5.2 compared to 5.4. Progressive Party, 3.8 compared to 4.2. Liberal Party, 3.2 compared to 3.8 percent last time.

## Tax Promises

Half the poll was taken after the Conservatives had buried their tax promises. It seems natural to assume that disappointed tax voters would seek consolation in the Progressive Party. But that has not happened. The Progressives lost ground too. The Labor Party managed to pick up part of the Conservative losses even though many put themselves in the "don't know" category for the time being.

The poll shows that for the first time in a long while Conservative voters are slipping. That is the dark side of being in power. The Conservative voters have been unusually stable for a long time but now that stability has been reduced to 85 percent. That means that 15 percent of those who voted for the Conservatives in the election would vote for another party in the event of an election today.

The Labor Party has "taken over" the Conservatives' stability. Some 95 percent of those who voted for the Labor Party in September would do the same today.

## Two-Party System

In a comment to ARBEIDERBLADET, the vice chairman of the Labor Party, Einar Forde, said that the figures should be taken calmly. "But of course the poll is good news and gives us a good starting position," he said. "However, we want to look at all the opinion polls in context over a period of several months before we try to cash in on this."

"The most interesting feature in this poll is that Conservative defectors did not go over to the Progressive Party," said Forde. "There appears to have been a crossover to the Labor Party. Apparently there is some shifting back and forth between the two big parties and that could mean a reinforcement in a trend toward a two-party system. That is interesting."

Does that mean disappointed tax voters are leaving the Conservatives for the Labor Party?

"The opinion poll shows great stability for the Labor Party and decreased stability for the Conservatives. No one can believe that the Conservative retreat on the tax issue lacked significance," said Forde.

Conservative Party officials also refused to get excited over a single opinion poll. Party chairman Jo Benkow told DAGBLADET that no party official likes an opinion poll indicating less support than before. But he did not think the Conservative figures were cause for concern. He wanted to see more opinion polls before he got really concerned.

6578

CSO: 3108/63

## FOREIGN MINISTRY PREPARING DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES FOR UNITED NATIONS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Feb 82 p 10

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry is now hard at work on preparing matters to be taken up at the second UN special session on arms reduction this June. As far as AFTENPOSTEN has been able to learn, Norway is especially concerned with being accepted as a full member on the UN international disarmament committee which meets in Geneva.

However Norway has competition from many other countries, including Finland and Denmark, when it comes to expanding an active observer status into full membership. Even so, Foreign Ministry people are optimistic with regard to getting Norway on the UN disarmament committee, especially because of our relatively active efforts in this area on the international level.

Through Norway's participation on the preparatory committee prior to the UN special session on arms reduction, Norway won support for the idea of allowing the problems of nuclear arms to play a central part during the session in June. This topic is quite controversial in the international organization, not least because several Third World countries are planning or would like to produce nuclear weapons. Norway has taken a firm position on nonproliferation in this context.

The UN special session is the first follow-up session since 1978, when the actual arms reduction session took place. Experts in the field have told AFTENPOSTEN that practically nothing has happened since then on the disarmament front, to such an extent that the summer conference is regarded more as a chance to bring things up to date without offering much chance of making progress when it comes to arms control and arms reduction.

6578

CSO: 3108/63



## PCE ORGAN DEEMS EARLY NATIONAL ELECTIONS LIKELY

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 29 Jan-4 Feb 82 p 3

[Text] The internal problems of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] once again introduced the topic of early elections which are not a way of avoiding the country's problems and which could be handled with determination and a desire for unity.

The UCD's internal problems once again cast a shadow over the political panorama with the clouds representing early elections. Even Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo--who had repeated ad infinitum that he would not call elections prior to 1983--is toning his statements down and prefixes the question with as many "buts" as there are UCD deputies threatening to switch sides. The ruling party is moving closer and closer to making real that assertion by the 80 deputies to the effect that the communists, some day, through Santiago Carrillo, are the real strength of the centrists among the Spanish electorate.

But one thing is sure and that is the one cannot govern with 80 deputies, nor with 150 deputies. The defections of the centrist deputies only help to accentuate the day-to-day policies of the current tenant in Moncloa, that is, forcing the administration to try to get help wherever it can at any particular moment and that again means governing to a somewhat lesser degree than the country requires at this time.

In view of these inevitable facts, rumors as to early elections seem to take on greater substances. These are not elections that are going to solve any problems; instead, they would leave the problems even more up in the air in a year when it is difficult to leave anything pending. The administration, which has pledged itself to that goal, is hinting at a tough struggle to fight the enormous ulcer represented by unemployment. And it is not difficult to imagine where the ANE [National Employment Accord] would wind up if there had to be an election campaign during the next several months.

The reform of the administration, a great task which has been left practically untouched, thus would be postponed further and this once again would prevent modernization and democratization of the government. The construction of the autonomous levels of government would also run into a roadblock and that is an unavoidable task which must be accomplished to permit everyone's participation, a task which cannot be held up by the weakness of the ruling party and its inability to tackle problems with realism.

If, in the face of the alternatives, we were to continue the way we are or call for elections, which nobody seems to want and which would do no good, then there would be no other possibilities and we will probably have to resign ourselves to the fact that the problems of the ruling party cannot be solved. The internal weakness of a party, which time and again has been reproached for lack of vision in sustaining the columns on which the country's weak democratic structure rests--that weakness is more obvious than ever before. Now we must once again urge that partisan interests be cast aside and that attention be devoted to the common good. We must call for the establishment of an administration which, from a broad social and parliamentary base, would be capable of taking the steps necessary to put Spanish democracy on a sound foundation.

This therefore does not seem to be the moment to brush aside that which separates us, nor to tackle the solutions and programs of the party in the just struggle for the votes of the Spanish people. This is the moment to rally our determination to consolidate a democracy which will enable all of us to fight against disillusionment and the problems of the Spanish society which knows that these solutions cannot wait.

5058

CSO: 3110/83

## PCE DISSENTER PROPOSES HOLDING EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 3 Feb 82 p 14

[Text] The Provincial Committee of the Madrid PCE [Spanish Communist Party] has proposed penalties for labor union leader Fidel Alonso who holds the job of secretary-general of the Worker Commissions of Madrid. The formal reason for this decision--which could lead to expulsion--is due to the fact that an information meeting was held last Sunday at a college in the University of Madrid summoned by Fidel Alonso among others, which was attended by pro-Soviet leader Pere Ardiaca, and others punished by the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia].

Fidel Alonso stated yesterday that he did not know whether this new series of punitive measures is due to the fact that the leadership "has lost its senses or that it wants the total destruction of the Communist Party of Spain" since this can "precipitate things at the very moment when many people are wondering whether or not they should renew their membership cards." He said that he is not in favor of postures aimed at abandonment and he added that the drama of the party's directorate resides in the fact that it embarked on a road on which "it has no other option than to veto the majority of this country's worker leaders."

"I do not want that which is now happening to the PSUC to spread to the rest of Spain," added Fidel Alonso. "Splits lead to the loss of influence. What we need is a complete change and the only solution is a special congress. Carrillo can continue to demand a government of concentration perhaps because he wants to be a minister but I am not worried about that; what does worry me is that the Communist Party of Spain is left without an organization and without militants in entire sectors and to resolve this acute crisis I believe that the moment has come for a special congress."

Penalties have also been proposed for Luis Cabo, the official in charge of the southern district federation of the PCE of Madrid who presided over the above-mentioned event and for actor Jose Sacristan. The latter is the star of movies such as "Asignature Pendiente," "Un Hombre Llamado Flor de Otono," "Solos en la Madrugada," and "El Divorcio Que Viene."

Luis Cabo declared that the event on Sunday was held "in view of the absence of objective information on what is happened in the PSUC"; he estimated the number of persons present at 2,500 and expressed his satisfaction with the way the event had gone. He also doubted that the PCE Provincial Committee might achieve its goal of expelling Fidel Alonso since he is "a man who is highly popular in his group, the Aeronautical Construction [Workers], and that is the only group that could approve

expulsion." Although he holds high office in the CC OO [Worker Commissions], Alonso is only a base militant in the PCE and therefore only the group in which he is a militant would be authorized to punish him.

Both Fidel Alonso and Luis Cabo are outstanding persons in the so-called radical or pro-Soviet sector of the Madrid communists and both signed a document entitled "Ante la crisis de nuestro partido, a todos los comunistas" [In View of Our Party's Crisis--To All Communists] which was signed by 200 members of the PCE and in which they assert: "We believe that the thing that is in a crisis in our party is its political and ideological identity" and "If Eurocommunism is expressed by what has been happening in recent years, then we are not Eurocommunists." The steps taken yesterday to obtain a story from the PCE Provincial Directorate were unsuccessful.

The punitive measures proposed by the PCE Provincial Committee also extend to other leaders of the same sector, such as Santiago Vidal, Angel Campos, and Ana Trapiello, all of whom are members of the confederation executive of the Worker Commissions.

The writer Manuel Vazquez Montalban through the Efe [Press Association] News Agency, denied rumors which appeared in some communications media concerning his possible departure from the PSUC.

5058

CSO: 3110/83

## PCE DECRIES 'OPPORTUNISTIC' UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PSOE, UCD

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 29 Jan-4 Feb 82 pp 10, 11

[Article by Manuel Torres: "A Hidden Legislative Agreement Between Administration and PSOE"]

[Excerpts] The talks between the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and the administration dealing with the autonomous agreements, the establishment of the Democratic Action parliamentary delegation headed by Fernandez Ordonez, and the problems which again arise in the Centrist parliamentary delegation constitute the substance of current political developments during a week when everything seems to point to the materialization of agreements between the socialists and centrists that would continue throughout the coming months until the disillusion of the chambers and the call for general elections.

Parliament will resume its sessions during this coming month of February. Among the major pending issues, there are three which appear to be of special significance: The University Autonomy Law, the Final Regulations of the Congress of Deputies, and the Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomous Process, an area in which all of the confrontations between the administration and the socialists have been taking place in recent weeks.

Because of the discussion on the charter of the Valencia area, the agreements relating to autonomy are experiencing a serious crisis from which they certainly have not yet recovered although it seems that they are on the way to recovery. The intemperate words which the socialist leaders uttered at the end of last year, reproduced during the failed interview of Wednesday of the week before, have yielded to much gentler comments in recent days during meetings held in Moncloa Palace.

#### No Definite Agreement

Words however cannot conceal the fact that there are major disagreements between the administration and the socialists concerning the fundamental points of the structure of the autonomous state. Specifically, the agreements regarding concrete points in the charter for Valencia were not resolved during the meeting held last Friday.

Some points dealing with the dispute that separate the centrists and socialists from that charter have been resolved, specifically regarding the role of the

Valencia deputations and the authority of the future autonomous government. Every thing seems to indicate that the centrists are going to pull back on that point. Rafael Arias Salgado declared that it would in effect be necessary to adapt some points to what was already approved in committee to the agreements signed by the PSOE and the administration on 31 July of last year.

But there are other aspects, such as the name of the future community, the language, and its symbols which still separate the socialists and the centrists. If we are to believe the statements of the minister of territorial administration, this would be an insurmountable obstacle. Once again, the government official responsible for the autonomous area insisted that these are topics that are outside the autonomy agreements. The socialists insist that this is not so and they stick to the postures they adopted in defense of the Constitutional Commission.

But one thing that is certain is that this topic must be considered from a broader perspective. It must be contemplated not only from the perspective of the total and overall nature of autonomy agreements but also from the viewpoint of other topics that can go into an agreement in the legislature--what there is left of it--a hidden agreement, along with an agreement among both parties on important issues which must be tackled in the future.

#### Two Can Play

Both the LAU [University Autonomy Law] and the Regulations of the Congress as well as the LOAPA [Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomous Process] have been and are being negotiated outside parliament. Everything seems to indicate that there are agreements between the cabinet presided over by Calvo-Sotelo and the party of Felipe Gonzalez, both of whom in practice want to lead other political forces out of the game on such important issues.

Regarding the topic of autonomy, this was clearly visible from the signing and negotiations of the agreements on. With the nationalist forces excluded from the very beginning, with the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] practically forced to abandon negotiations, the thing that is less important is the words which, initially, can give the impression that there is a clash between two political majority forces. The thing that sealed the autonomy agreements was the desire of both parties to accomplish the autonomy process by excluding the others. And this is what has to be done over again in these days; this is what almost certainly will be confirmed after the second round of negotiations to be held before the Congress of Deputies resumes its work during the coming days of February.

Economic topics seem to be faring better for the time being than political topics, including the confrontation between the topic of the Charter for Extremadura which seems more easily soluble. Problems concerning the Charter for Valencia undoubtedly will be at the very focus of conversations during the next several days.

#### UCD Problems Revived

It is true that Calvo-Sotelo will find it much more difficult to get through the period of time that is coming with his own forces. The difficulties which he will have to face again in the parliamentary delegation of the UCD and in his own party will make it completely necessary for him to arrive at agreements with the socialists, committed as he is to the job of not providing the solution which the country would really want such as the establishment of a cabinet with a broad social and parliamentary base.



The socialists for their part seem to have forgotten the statements made by Felipe Gonzalez last month and they once again support an administration which is in trouble. That is based not only on a series of objective reasons, based on the need for political stability, but also on more day-to-day and partisan concerns. Since they come out on top in public opinion surveys, the socialists know that political instability would be basically harmful to them and the closeness of elections--in spite of the less and less clear denials by the prime minister himself--is really in the air.

There are certainly also symptoms of political instability coming from the UCD itself. The problems in its parliamentary delegation have become more serious in recent days and the call for a meeting to be held soon among the members of the so-called "moderate platform" does not introduce any tranquilizing elements for the centrists.

#### Defection of Deputies

The centrist party and its administration are facing a major walkout by new members of their parliamentary delegation. Carlos Gila and Melian Gil may join in with the already announced decision of the centrist representative of Almeria, Francisco Soler Valero, who intends to join the parliamentary delegation of Fraga.

The deputy for Almeria, previously belonging to a social democratic current, made his decision during a supper held in Segovia with Carlos Gila which was also attended by Christian Democratic Deputy Miguel Herrero de Minon, one of the members of the UCD who worked hardest for an alliance between the leader of the Democratic Coalition and Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo.

Until now, there is confirmation only of the departure of Mr Soler Valero since Carlos Gila seems to have postponed his decision until the end of the month. This deputy from Segovia is waiting for the resolution of the disciplinary proceedings connecting with his posture in favor of the single-province autonomy of Segovia and for having used the word "fascist" in describing the agreements between the UCD and the PSOE for the inclusion of that province in the autonomist community of Castilla-Leon.

Melian Gil, for his part, neither denies nor confirms his switch to the Centrist Parliamentary Delegation; instead, he made some rather strong statements: "We are now living through a period of utmost intoxication," said the deputy from Galicia "since Goebbels. This is the great distortion of putrefied public life. Here nobody has any idea of what the democratic rules are. If they were to devote themselves to governing Spain instead of intoxicating public opinion, everything would go better. We all know who is floating all those rumors. Or does anybody perhaps believe that the campaign against Adolfo Suarez was an accident?"

The statements by Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo on Monday night are palpable proof of the UCD's difficult situation. Right now, it could count only on 150 deputies and that clearly is not enough. The call for early elections seems to be a reality even for the number one man in the executive branch, no matter how much he may wish to hold off until 1983. Because of all this, there is no certainty that the centrists would be capable of stopping the blood-letting of their deputies.

## Ordenez Without Delegation in Parliament

In other news, there is every indication that Francisco Fernandez Ordenez will wind up without a parliamentary group of his own. The decision, as we know, is now in the hands of Congress President Landelino Lavilla and this issue is not viewed kindly by the communists who recently made public a note in which they asked that it should be the Board of Spokesmen and not exclusively the prime minister who would decide on that topic.

In this connection it is not a matter of indifference that the administration and the centrist party are opposed to the establishment of a social-democratic parliamentary delegation. This was made public rather forcefully both by Inigo Cavero and Jaime Lamo de Espinosa, who participates in his twin capacity as president of the Centrist Parliamentary Delegation and as minister.

Landelino Lavilla has backing when he says "no" to the claims of Fernandez Ordenez. The Chamber's legal services have drafted a report upholding the idea that parliamentary delegations must constitute themselves before the Board is made up, even though they have turned out to be favorable to the idea of having deputies switch from one parliamentary group to other groups which are already constituted. At any rate, the few possibilities of the Democratic Action Party rest on the fact that there are no precedents on this point and therefore the interpretation of the Provisional Regulations of the Congress cannot be made in a linear fashion. But it is certain that Fernandez Ordenez has few tickets in this raffle.

5058

CSO: 3110/83

## VPK PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ISSUES POLAND STATEMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Feb 82 p 10

[Text] Swedish conservative forces oppose all demands for expanded democratic rights and privileges at places of work in Sweden. This is why their concern for the rights of the working class in Poland is false and hypocritical.

This is what the Left Party-Communist (VPK) executive committee said in a statement on Sunday. The party reiterated its demands that martial law in Poland be lifted, that those who have been detained for political reasons be released and that union and civil rights and privileges be restored.

The VPK's support for the efforts of Polish workers to achieve independent rule is consistent, since "we are fighting for the same goal in our own country," the executive committee says.

There is today a clear dividing line between the VPK and several of the Eastern European communist parties. But it is even more important to have a dialogue and cooperation with them, as well as with Social Democratic parties, it is said.

"However, the VPK is not prepared to participate in talks, conferences or meetings which are understood as acceptance of oppression against any movement that is for socialist and democratic renewal."

The party executive committee believes that greater democracy is the only way to attack the crisis and symptoms of crisis of the capitalist world which exist in socialist nations.

The Swedish way to socialism is a struggle leading toward "all parts of state and society, industrial and working life having been subjected to democratic rule."

In another statement the thought of a political strike against "the government's attacks on the health insurance and unemployment benefits" is supported.

"Only resolute demands on the part of the workers can prevent the government's attacks."

11949

CSO: 3109/102

## FALLDIN: TRADE WITH POLAND DEPENDS ON REFORM PROGRAM

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Feb 82 p 2

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "Falldin: 'No Increase in Trade With Poland'"]

[Text] It is difficult to envision any opportunities for much of an increase in trade with Poland in the near future, Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin said in a Parliamentary debate with VPK [Left Party-Communist] delegate Oswald Soderqvist on Monday. Under the present circumstances the situation is not such that there is reason to enter into direct talks with the Polish state leadership, in Thorbjorn Falldin's opinion.

The development of trade depends on whether Poland carries out its reform and stabilization programs, Thorbjorn Falldin said in his reply to Oswald Soderqvist's question regarding increased Polish-Swedish trade.

In February last year the government made a maximum guarantee of 250 million crowns available for export credits to Poland. In all, Sweden's aid to Poland amounts to about three-fourths of a billion crowns in rescheduled debt payments and new credits, the prime minister said. But the credit decision was made against the background of the situation at that time, with a free trade union movement and great independence for the companies.

For the time being the funds remaining in last year's credit framework will be used, since the circumstances did not turn out the way one had anticipated.

Sweden is not prepared for any boycotts or sanctions against Poland, except in case the UN Security Council decides on such measures, the prime minister said, in accordance with the Swedish policy of neutrality. Oswald Soderqvist wanted to know whether possibilities exist for increasing coal imports from Poland despite the fact that Polish coal is considered "dirty," with various residual substances.

"If we want to sell for example iron ore, we must be able to buy. And we need more coal for, among other things, our energy supply," Oswald Soderqvist said.

Falldin considered it "extremely doubtful" that the Poles have any coal to export at the present time. Thorbjorn Falldin did not reply to Oswald Soderqvist's repeated question as to whether the government sees any possibility of increasing coal imports from Poland.

11949

CSO: 3109/102

## TURKMEN ASSESSES NATO MEETING, POLAND

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 10 Jan 82 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ankara--Turkey favors the discussion of the Polish problem within the framework of the European Security and Cooperation Conference. This stance of Turkey's was enunciated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilter Turkmen who left [Ankara] for Brussels to attend tomorrow's extraordinary meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council which will discuss the Polish issue and the steps to be taken against the Soviet Union. Turkmen said: "We believe that the issue must be taken up within the framework of the European Security and Cooperation Conference as proposed by the United States and the EEC. We support a meeting on the issue among the foreign ministers of countries participating in the European Security and Cooperation Conference."

What will Turkey's stance be at the NATO meeting? Judging from Turkmen's words it appears that the final stance will be clear at the conclusion of the talks in Brussels. While determining its own stance Turkey will carefully evaluate the differences of opinion between the United States and Europe. Turkmen emphasized this point in the press conference he held before his departure yesterday. He said: "We will try to evaluate the views of both the United States and the EEC."

According to Turkmen's statements, Turkey believes that the "external factor" had a role in the declaration of martial law and subsequent developments in Poland. Turkmen did not mention the Soviet Union by name; instead he obliquely referred to an "external factor," Turkmen said.

"Naturally, we would like to see the Polish problems solved by the people of Poland. However, we cannot pretend not to see that the Polish problem has assumed bigger proportions and expanded beyond the borders of Poland. The role of certain external factors is obvious."

Turkmen added, however, that "it cannot be claimed that there has been a full external intervention in Poland."

As is known, the United States has been maintaining that economic sanctions must be imposed against the Soviet Union on grounds that that country interfered in Poland's internal affairs. At the EEC meeting held last week a substitute policy stance was developed to counter the U.S. stance. At the moment Turkey does not

envision imposing economic sanctions against the Soviet Union on its own or joining an economic embargo that may be imposed. Turkmen implied this viewpoint obliquely by saying: "These are primarily economic measures. However, each country must take into account its own special circumstances. As a developing country Turkey must keep its special circumstances in mind."

Turkey also favors food assistance to Poland. In reply to a question on this issue Turkmen said: "The European countries are trying to provide food assistance to Poland. At this stage I do not know what field our assistance will be in."

Asked about his views on the communique approved by the EEC meeting, Turkmen said: "We did not attend that meeting. On the other hand, the communique contains ideas which we approve." Asked to elaborate on that, Turkmen said:

"1. It is impossible not to concur with the evaluation given by the communique.

"2. The process of national conciliation in Poland has been brought to a halt. The communique mentions external factors. Once again it is impossible not to concur. We emphasize and support a dialog.

"3. The communique asks for humanitarian aid to Poland. We support that idea also."

Turkmen was also asked about views concerning comparisons between Turkey and Poland made particularly in Scandinavian countries. Turkmen replied: "There can be no comparison in any respect."

9588

CSO: 4654/141



## MUMCU COMMENTS ON CHANGES IN PENAL ARTICLES 141, 142

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Jan 82 pp 1, 9

[Column by Ugur Mumcu: "141-142"]

[Text] It is reported that preparations are under way to revise Articles 141 and 142 of the [Turkish] Penal Code and that the penalties currently mandated by the articles will be made more severe. These preparations mean that Articles 141 and 142 are once again on the agenda.

Articles 141 and 142 were included in the Penal Code for the first time in 1936. As is known, the model for these articles is the "fascist Italian penal code" of the Mussolini period.

In their original form the articles used the concept of "masses" instead of "classes" and endorsed as fundamental grounds for implementation the condition of "toppling through the use of force." The use of "force" was deemed as fundamental grounds for the implementation of the articles which defined illegal acts in terms such as "establishment of oppressive supremacy by means of force, by one social mass in the country over others," "annihilation by means of force" and "toppling by means of force."

In the original form prison sentences mandated by Article 141 varied from 5 to 12 years while those mandated by Article 142 varied from 1 to 5 years.

The articles were revised in 1938 and the definition and condition of "use of force" were dropped. However, the "use of force" was considered as grounds for raising the severity of a sentence. As a result of this revision prison sentences mandated by Article 141 were reduced to "2 to 5 years" while those mandated by Article 142 were reduced to "1 to 5 years."

Following the introduction of the "multiparty system" in 1946 the articles were revised again and prison sentences mandated by Article 141 were raised to "5 to 12 years" while those mandated by Article 142 were reduced to "6 months to 2 years." However, the articles stated that the act of propaganda with the aim of establishing "oppressive supremacy of one social mass over others...by means of force" would carry an additional prison sentence of "up to 5 years."

By the revision of the articles in 1949 the concept of "masses" was replaced by the concept of "classes." Prison sentences mandated by Article 141 were changed

to "3 to 10 years" while those mandated by Article 142--except on grounds of use of force--were raised to "1 to 5 years."

By the revision of 1951 the term "use of force" was dropped from the text of the articles. Prison sentences mandated by the articles were raised following the introduction of the multiparty system. The revision of 1951 raised prison sentences mandated by Article 141/1 to "8 to 15 years" and those mandated by Article 142/1 to "5 to 12 years."

The revision of 1951 also adopted the principle of a "death sentence for those who administer or direct some or all organizations in this category." Accordingly, if, for example, an individual functioned as the executive officer of a Marxist party and a labor union at the same time and if this party and union fit the definition given by Article 141/1, then that individual could be given the death sentence.

As is seen, the penalties mandated by Articles 141 and 142 have become quite severe since the introduction of the multiparty system in this country. It appears that the latest revision of the articles will make the penalties even more severe.

What can be said?

The world is changing at a fast pace. In this process thoughts, ideologies and beliefs change their form and content. For example, within the framework specified by Articles 141 and 142 certain "-isms" have emerged in direct opposition to each other. The articles turn a blind eye to these changes.

Numerous events in Turkey and around the world show that humanity is faced with a "phenomenon of multinational terror." In such a world, it is necessary to grant "freedoms of speech and organization" to all ideas on condition that a constitutional system is endorsed and to do away with all bans of this type. Focusing legal measures and penalties on "active and armed organizations" will help us understand the "phenomenon of multinational terror" better and consequently bring an end to this crime against humanity in a shorter period of time.

The "phenomenon of multinational terror" is beyond the framework of the right to think and organize freely. After so many experiences it must be clear that there is no connection between the severity of the penalties mandated by Articles 141 and 142 and the prevention of terror.

The "least common denominator" and the most common basis of democracy is "unlimited freedom of thought and merciless action and penalties against guns."

If this is not yet understood we stand to make several more turns in the same vicious circle.

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## GOVERNMENT POSTPONES DECISION ON JAS BECAUSE OF SDP

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Feb 82 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Decision on JAS Delayed"]

[Text] The government's definitive decision on the military aircraft JAS will be delayed. This was stated by Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin after the talks on Monday with the Social Democratic party leadership.

However, most things indicate that the government will submit a proposal to Parliament for building the plane, since the Social Democrats have not categorically opposed the project.

There must be incredibly strong reasons in order to consent to a postponement, Falldin said after the talks. The Social Democrats argued in favor of such a postponement, since negotiations with the industry have not been concluded.

Falldin began by stating that the partners in the Defense Committee agreed that Sweden needs a new fighter aircraft. One solution is then a Swedish aircraft, but it cannot be built at any cost, in Falldin's opinion.

Negotiations are being conducted with the industry, and we have now received some of the Social Democrats' points of view. These viewpoints cannot be simply disregarded. This is why we have not made any decision today, Falldin said.

What is important is that the Swedish defense establishment be supplied with a new military aircraft, but it cannot take place at any cost whatsoever. The agreement which will be made must lie within the indicated economic framework, Falldin finally underscored.

Palme Angry

Olof Palme left the talks quite early. He emphasized that the unclear points remain and that new contacts will be made between the government and the Social Democrats.

Palme was quite furious about the reports that Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten is purported to have said that the government will submit a proposal for the JAS regardless of what the Social Democrats have to say.

Plame called this an insult and hinted that there have been thoughts of breaking off the talks with the government.

It is the Social Democrats who requested talks with the government in order to clarify obscure points. This concerns primarily the engine from General Motors, but also the aircraft's production run.

A preliminary estimate is for 250 aircraft to be built for the Swedish defense establishment.

The attitude of the Social Democrats is taken as a sign that one is not prepared to wage war against the government if the latter were to force through the aircraft decision. In that case it would hardly have been necessary to demand talks with the government.

A positive reply can scarcely be expected from the Social Democrats. If the government submits a JAS proposal to Parliament, opposition may be expected from the Social Democrats on several points.

Kjell-Olof Feldt and party secretary Sten Andersson, as well as defense expert Ulf Larsson, sat in on the talks with the government for a long time. This trio emphasized that the government is weakening the bargaining position by now coming out and stating that there will be a Swedish JAS. The opinion was that the industry can be forced to make additional concessions if it is kept on tenterhooks.

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